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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
.MEL VIN F. HULET, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DANIEL TULLIS and 
MARILYN H. TULLIS, 
his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 12615 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff wherein he filed a Com~ 
plaint seeking restitution or possession of certain real 
propert)r and improvements thereon, located in Iron 
Connt)\ Utah, and defendants filed Counterclaim for de-
rrep of specific performance on an alleged oral buy and 
Rale contract between the parties, the plaintiff contending 
thr cas<> is within the Statute of Frauds, there being no 
rontract <lne to lack of an executed document, and the 
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defendants contending that the matter is without th(' 
Statute of Frauds, or an exception thereto, because of 
their action and partial performance pursuant to the al- ' 
leged oral contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Iron County, Utah, entered 
Judgment on August 5, 1971, ordering that plaintiff have 
restitution of the realty and improvements and further 
ordering that the value of improvements made by de-
fendants are an offset against plaintiff's claim for rent 
and damages, the Court finding that there was not a 
ing of the minds between the parties hence no enforceable 
oral buy and sale contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This Appeal is taken by defendants asking this 
Honorable Court to reverse the ruling of the Trial Court 
and remand the case back to said Trial Court with a man-
date to decree specific performance on the part of plain-
tiff for the behalf of defendants pursuant to the Counter-
claim of defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to .July 24, 1969, plaintiff Hulet and his wife 
had talked with defenclantf; TulliR on occasion abont sell-
iug to def'euuants a small lot in Newcastle, Iron County, 
Utah, on which there is located a small frame home (Tr. 
49, 88-89). However, negotiations had not succeeded for 
either party (Tr. 49-50). Then, on July 24, 1969, at the 
rodeo grounds at Enterprise, Utah, the Hulets told the 
'11nllis people that they could buy the property for 
$5,000.00 total purchase price at $200.00 as down payment 
and $100.00 per month. and further, that they, the Hulets, 
would get a contract drawn by their attorney but that in 
the meantime defendants could go ahead and make im-
provements on the premises and move in (Tr. 50, 89). 
The parents of defendant Daniel Tullis were present and 
heard the conversation between the Tullis people and 
Hulets and so testified at the trial (Tr. 37-38, 43-44). 
The oral agreement made at Enterprise, Utah on 
July 24, 1969 was that Hulets would sell the home and 
lot together with 42 shares of Newcastle Town Water for 
the total price of $5,000.00, with $200.00 down payment 
and $100.00 per month, with 8% interest on the unpaid 
balance. The Hulets were to deliver a Warranty Deed 
and Abstract into escrow whereupon these documents 
would be delivered to the Tullis people upon full payment 
of the contract. Plaintiff Hulet testified (Tr. 19-23) as 
did his wife (Tr. 116) as to the total price, terms, water 
and escrow provisions and that they were to obtain a 
rnntrart covering- these terms. 
Tlw first part of August, 1969, Tullis began making 
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improvements on the borne and lot (Tr. 51-52). However , 
at this time, the Hulets had not yet obtained a written 
contract. During the first part of August, 1969, defen-
dant Marilyn Tullis met Mr. Hulet at the Newcastle Post 
Office. Mr. Hulet advised her that he would bring the 
contract out as soon as possible (Tr. 40, 90). The Tullis 
people were anxious to obtain the contract and on approx-
imately September 1, 1969, they contacted Mrs. Hulet and 
were advised by her again to go ahead and move in the 
house and improve it as if it were their own and that she 
would get the contract drawn and have them sign it (Tr. ' 
91). Included in these improvements were repairs to sew-
er, sewer line, plumbing, heating system, painting, car-
peting, paneling and cement work (Tr. 63-64). Aside from 
their labor beginning in August, 1969, they expended a 
total sum of $1,454.00 on materials from the date of Se~- • 
tember 15 to November 15, 1969 (Exhibit D-3 and Tr. 
65-67). Even though no written contract of sale had been 
presented or signed by the parties, the Tullis people 
moved into the premises approximately November 15. 1 
1969, being assured repeatedly by the Hulets that a lrit-
ten contract was forthcoming. At this time the improve-
ments were completed (Tr. 52, 64, 98). After the Tullis 
people had moved into the premises, Mrs. Tullis again 
met Mr. Hulet at the Newcastle Post Office and inqnirrd 
about a written contract. Sh<> was advised hv Mr. Hnlet 
at that time that his wifo was "drag;i!,"ing h<>r fret" h111 
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that he would get things "straightened out" (Tr. 41). 
Finally, in latter November or December, 1969, the Hulets 
presented a contract drawn by their attorney, identified 
as Exhibit D-1, to the Tullis people (Tr. 54, 93). How-
ever, thiH contract did not provide for the water trans-
fer and for an escrow arrangement (Tr. 32-33, 54, 93, 
116) as agreed upon by the parties. As a result of this 
omission, the Tullis people did not sign the contract (Tr. 
54). When the Hulets were adYised that, because of the 
lack of water and escrow provisions, the Tullis people 
would not execute the contract, Mr. Hulet indicated that 
he would have it changed (Tr. 57). Some time thereafter, 
during latter 1969, the Tullis people had their attorney, 
Durham Morris, prepare an agreement which provided 
for the water sale and escrow in addition to the other 
terms of the agreement between the parties (Ex71ibi.f 
D-2). This contract was presented by Tullis to the Hulets 
(Tr. 57), and, as Mr. Hulet testified (Tr. 35), at this 
time the ''deal'' was still on. In fact, the agreement the 
Tullis people presented was a true restatement of their 
oral arrangement (Tr. 128) but was not si '\'nerl by the 
Hnlets because of their feelings toward th<> attornev who 
prepared the agreement (Tr. 58, 95, 1~8). Even Mrs. 
Hulet admitted the contrnct drawn hy Tullis 'R attoriwy 
rontained the terms agTeed upon (Tr. 128). 
Plaintiff and wif<> hoth indicated thPv had an a<r.rPe-
mPnt with thP '1'111lis DPOfl]P to RPll thPm thP nr'lpPrtv 
ti 
(Tr. 16-23, 116). However, plaintiff testified that he, on 
November 15, 1969, told the Tullis people that the "deal 
was all off" (Tr. 7). The defendants testified this wa~ ' 
not so (Tr. 98). In fact, plaintiff gave conflicting testi-
mony in that the ''deal'' was still on when he was pre-
sented with the contract drawn by Mr. l\Iorris which was 
approximately December, 1969 (Exhibit D-2, Tr. 35, 37). ' 
From this time on, the plaintiff ignored the Tullis people 
(Tr. 8, 30) even though he passed by the premises in 
question four times daily in his employment (Tr. 11). 
In December of 1969, defendants borrowed money to pay , 
the $200.00 down payment but never made the payment 
(Tr. 59-60) due to apprehensions caused by Hulets' fail-
ure to get a written contract (Tr. 60, 73). Even though 
the defendants had never been personally advised that 
the deal was off (Tr. 96), in the Spring of 1970 they no-
ticed that Hulets had listed the property for sale with a 
real estate agent who had placed an advertisement in one 
of the local papers (Tr. 96-97). This was the first time 
defendants suspected that the transaction might not go 
through (Tr. 96, 98). On June 23, 1970, plaintiff had the ~ 
Iron County Sheriff serve Notice to Quit upon defendants 
(Tr. 10), said Notice being marked Exhibit P-2. Defend-
ants refused to vacate the premises (Tr. 9) and SummollS 
was served on Defendants in July of 1970. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RES-
TITUTION TO PLAINTIFF AND BY NOT DECREE-
ING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ON THE ORAL 
CONTRACT DUE TO THE PARTIAL PERFOR-
MANCE OF DEFENDANTS. 
It is a general rule that the statute of frauds requires 
a writing for the enforceability of any contract to create 
or transfer any interest in land. Simpson on Contracts, 
2nd Ed., sec. 77, p. 153. The Utah Legisl~ture codified 
this general rule in Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, which provides, in part, "No estate or interest in 
real property ... shall be created, granted, assigned, sur-
rendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of la:w, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by 
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same ... '' However, it is further a general 
rnle that courts will decree specific performance of an 
oral land contract, despite the statute of frauds, where 
there has been substantial part performance in reliance 
on the oral contract, said performance to be referable to 
the oral contract, and providing the remedy of claimant 
for the Yalne of his part performance is inadequate so 
that to d<>.ny enforcement would be to work ~ fraud on 
the partv performing. 8impsnn, snpra, sec. 79, page 157. 
'rhr Utah L<>.gislature has adopted a provision allowing 
thP rmirts to adopt, and enfore<>. this general exception 
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to the statute of frauds. Section 25-5-8 of Utah ('1J1/!' An-
notated, 1953, provides that "Nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to com- ' 
pel the specific performance of agreements in case of part 
performance thereof.'' 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has adopted · 
the doctrine of part performance as an exception to the 
statute of frauds. Brinton v. Van Cott, Utah 1893, 8 Ut. 
480, 33 P. 218, and Price v. Lloyd, Utah 1906, :n Ft. 86, 
86 P. 767. In the Price case at page 770, the Court adopt-
ed and restated Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Con-
tracts, saying: 
''When a verbal contract has been made, and one 
party has knowingly aided or permitted the other 
to go on and do acts in part performance of the • 
agreement, acts done in fnll ~eliance upon such 
agreement as a valid and binding contract, and 
which would not have been done without the ag-ree-
ment, and which are of such a natnre as to chanQ'r 
the relation of the parties, and to prevent a re'-
toration to their former condition and l:Pl adequate ' 
compensation for th<' ]oss hv a ]ega] jndg-ment for 
damages, then it wou1<l h<' a virtual frand in thr 
first party to interpose the statute of frarnfa as a 
bar to a completion of the contract. ann thns to 
secure for hims(l]f all the hf'n(lfit of the artR al-
readv done in part performance. '"hil(l the othrr 
. f ~c partv would not onlv lose all advanta tr<' rom 
bargain, hnt would he left without acl<'mrnte rem-
t . f ·h11t hr po~· for his failnr(l or comrwnsa 10n or " 
had done in pursuance of it. To prevent the success 
of such a palpable fraud, equity interposes under 
these circumstances, and compels an entire com-
yiletion of the contract by decreeing its specific 
execution.'' 
The Court in Pria wrnt on to state, at pag;e 771: 
''It mm;t appear that the improvements. relied 
upon as part performance, are of a character per-
manently beneficial to the land and involving a 
sacrifice to him who made them beeause and in rP-
liance of the gift.'' 
Further, the Court stated, at page 772: 
"Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine 
(of part performance) have not, by any means, 
intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only 
to prevent its being made the means of perpetrat-
ing a fraud. In order that a plaintiff be permitted 
to give evidenee of a contract not in writirn:i;, and 
which is in the verv teeth of the statute and a 
nullity at law, it is essential that he establish, bv 
el ear and pOf;itive -proof, acts and thino;s done in 
pursuance and on account thereof. exclnsivelv re-
ferable thereto, and which take it ont of the oper-
ation of the Rtatnte." (Parenthesis mine.) 
The Prire r. TAnwl ease was cited nnmerons times bv 
thr Court in H nrnrpn1·ps 1·. R11rtnri. Utah 1922. 5~ Ut. 57fi. 
20() P. 2G2. ;:tR h0irn2.· the ontstanding case in Utah pertain-
inr.· to th0 (lodrinP of partial nerformance. 
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In the east• i11 rr, Jfru/:.;c11 's /~'stat,, rl·t.c·tli ')-' I' ,);,, ·~.-) . ;>, 
2d .J!J.) at page (iOl, the l'tah ( 1011rt stat Pd: 
"Part performane<> 'd1ieh will ~ffoi<l :c:tatnt(' of 
fnn~ds 1:11'ay. eonsist of an;- aet whieh P11ts party 
performmg- Ill sneli position that nonpPrformanrr 
h;- other wonlcl eonsti1nt<> fra11(1." 
In another ease dPaling- witl1 n:irt pPrfonnnnrf'. tlw 
rtah Court stated: 
"Jt is to he notP(l that possession hY thP p}::~intiff 
is rep:arded as an important fad, on<' whirh is g-en-
erall;- directl:- reforahle to the contract, and '\'hen 
combined with 1wrmanent and Yaluahle improw-
ments whieh are n•presentatiYe 0f the existenrr of 
an oral contraet. Yirtnalh- eYerY jnrisdirtion will 
grant spef'ifie performance." Ra1·ariwJ 1·. Prirr, 
Utah 1%B, 2GO P. 2c1 ;)70, at pag-P G79. 
In Rarari110, at pag-P G79, the Court statPil that wherP 
possession is reliPcl 1111011 "it must hP of such natnre that 
it would not haYP hePn l!:iYPn without the prpspnce of an 
oral rontract to com'e>-· '' For other Ptah cas0s whrrein 
the Ptah Court affirm0d thP floetrillC' of nart perfor· 
manee SC'C rrtal! Merc11r (ir:ld Millillrt ('o .. l'f (/1., I'. Her· 
stlid Gold Mi11i11q r'o., rt (/l .. Utah Hl4B, B4 P. 2d 1094. 
J,eGrand Johnso11 C'orpornfim1 r. Peff'r.•w11, l'f (ll., Utah 
1071, 2G Ptah 2fl 1G8, 48fi P. 2c1 1040, aml Ho_qn11 ,. 
Fi1l'mp:r', et al .. TTtah 1!12;), ()?) lTt. ::!80, 2::!7 P 1097, whrrr 
th0 Co11rt lwhl that wlwr0 th0 y0nrl00 achrnlh- occnnie<l 8 
portion nf l:11Hl m·1l:in°· s11h"tan+inl imnroY0m0nts thrrron. 
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he was entitled to specific performance of oral contract 
' the facts justifying an exception to the statute of frauds. 
Bee also 8 i illpsou, supra, Sec. 79. 
The Utah Court has dealt with the sufficiency and 
types of acts which will satisfy the exception of part per-
formance. In Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 
Utah 1%6, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P. 2d 480, at page 484, the 
Court outlined three general criteria in removing an oral 
contract from the Statute, they being: 
''First, the oral contract and its terms must be 
clear and definite; second, the acts done in perfor-
mance of the contract must be equally clear and 
definite; and third, the acts must be in reliance on 
the contract.'' 
In the case of Latses, et al., 1·. Nick Flnor, Inc., Utah 1940, 
104 P. 2d 619, the Court held that improvements made 
upon premises may take a contract relating to such prem-
ises out of the statute of frauds even to the extent of re-
quiring a conveyance of the premises pursuant to an oral 
agreement. The improvements made in the Latses case 
were cement work, repairing; floors, repairing; the stairs, 
repairing the toilets and plumbing, painting, paneling, 
repairing; the electric wiring and placing a floor ventilat-
or in the premises. The Court considered these improve-
mentR to he permanent. ThP Co11rt in Lafsr',s state<l: 
"The defense of the statute of frauds mav not be 
irnrrl as n m0m1s of (lpfra11ding- a party to a ron-
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tract. If he has iwrformcu his side of the ag-reo-
ment, the• other party may not accept the benefits 
of that performance and c1011~- the liabilities; but , 
this presupposes that he who accepts thoHe benefits 
has actual or constructin.• knowledge of their exis-
tance. '' Pag·e G23. 
Tlw Court nlso stated on paµ:e 622 that the improvements • 
mlrnt he ''something more than repairs that a tenant from 
month to month might make simply for his own conven-
ience." 
Simpson, supra, sec. 78, p. 158, indicates possession 
coupled with valuable and permanent improvements is 
ronsi(lcred the strongest and most unequivocal act of part 
performance. 
The theory of the doctrine of part performance is 
hasecl upon the premise that it would be a fraud upon the 
Yendee if the vendor were permitted to escape the perfor· 
manc0 of his part of the oral agreement after he has per-
mitte<l the Yenc10e to perform in reliance upon the oral ' 
agreement. 4!1 A m.l11r, Statute of Frauds, sec. 421, pages 
72:J-G. ri'his Hection further provides: 
''The oral rontract is enforced in harmony with the 
principal that eonrt::-; of equity will not allow th~ 
stat11t0 of frands to h(' used as an instrument 0 
frall<l. Tn other worclR, th0 doctrine of part perfor· 
rnmw<> wn~ 0stnhlished for the samr pnrpOf;e for 
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which the statute of frauds itself was enacted . ' namely, for the prevent10n of fraud, and arose 
from the necessity of preventing the statute from 
becoming an agent of fraud, for it could not have 
been the intention of the statute'to enable any par-
ty to commit a fraud with impunity." (Pages 
725-6). 
See also 37 C.J.S., Frauds, Statute of, sec. 248, p. 755. 
To summarize, there are six elements which should 
be discussed regarding the doctrine of part performance. 
First, the acts relied upon must be such as to 
change the vendee 's position, resulting in fraud, 
injustice or hardship if the contract is not enforced. 
49 .AmJur, Statute of Frauds, sec. 427, p. 734. Second, 
the part performance must be prejudicial to the perform-
ing party placing him in a situation which will not result 
in compensation and which situation he would have avoid-
ed had there been no contract. 49 .AmJur, supra, p. 734. 
Third, the act of the vendee must ref er solely to the con-
tract and be substantial, 49 .AmJur supra p. 734. 
Fourth, there need not (emphasis mine) be payment by 
vendee where it appears that he had a good reason for 
not making said payment. 49 .AmJur, supra, sec. 435, p. 
7 41. Fifth, though there need not be possession of the 
premises in question by the vendee, possession coupled 
with valuable improvements is said to be the strong-est 
-14 
act of part performance by which an oral contract to sell 
land is taken out of the statute of frauds. 49 AmJur, sup-
ra, sec. 449, p. 755-6. Sixth, in order to constitute part ' 
performance, the improvements must be made with the 
knowledge and consent or acquiescence of the vendor. 49 
Am.Ju.r, supra, sec. 451, p. 758. 
The facts indicate that on July 24, 1969, plaintiff 
and/or his wife told the defendants that they would sell 
to them the house, lot, and 42 shares of water stock for 
$5,000.00 to be paid by $200.00 down payment and $100.00 . 
a month to an escrow trustee. Further, the defendants 
made vast improvements expending a considerable 
amount of money on the premises from August, 1969 to 
November, 1969, in reliance on this contract. Defendants 
moved into the premises, even though they had not signed 
a contract, on the assurance of plaintiff and his wife. 
Defendants would not have expended the labor and money 
on the premises had it not been for the fact that plaintiff 
and/or his wife told them to move in and do as they 
wished (Tr. 68, 84). It is clear from the testimony (Tr. 
16-23, 37-38, 43-44, 50, 89, 116) that the parties herein had 
a "meeting of the mir.ds" as to every aspect of the al-
leged contract. In fact, all testimony by plaintiff, his wife, 
and the defendants was to the effect that Exhibit D-1 
was what thev had agreed npon orally, excepting a pro· 
vision for th.e wat<"r and for the escrow arrangement 
which was to hC' sPt np. Further, fill the tPstimonv in<li· 
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cates that tlie contract obtained by defendants, Exhibit 
D-2, was a true reflection of their deal but that Hulets 
would not execute it because of the particular attorney 
who drafted the agreement. There was testimony by de-
fendants that they were already living in an apartment 
which was in better condition than these specific premises 
for a rental of $40.00 per month (Tr. 63). It doesn't 
seem likely that they would have moved into these prem-
ises on a rental arrangement where thne was a need for 
vast improvements when they were already living under 
better conditions. 
Appellants submit that the facts of this case fall 
within, and are governed by, the preceding case law 
which this Honorable Court has handed down. There is 
no question but that the acts of defendants were per-
formed in reliance upon a clear and definite oral con-
tract. See Randall, supra. Further, there is n0 question 
but that the labor and improvements of defendants were 
permanent, valuable and sufficient to brinq; this parti-
cular case within the exception of partial performance. 
Ree Lasesc, supra. 
Each and every requisite or element of the part per-
formance doctrine has been satisfied. First, defendants' 
acts definitely changed their position which will result 
in fraud and injustice if the oral contract is not enforced. 
RPco11rl. tl1P defondants arE' placed in a situation where 
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there can be no adequate compensation other than speci-
fic performance and, also, they arc in a situation which 
definitely would have been avoided had there been no con- • 
tract. Third, the acts of defendants were brought about 
by, and ref er solely to, the oral contract. Fourth. there 
is sufficient evidence that defendants were readv willin~ . ' ~ 
and able to make the down payment but that they were • 
completely ignored by plaintiff and his wife, even though 
payment is not a requirement under the part performance 
doctrine. Fifth, defendants were in possession of the 
premises and still are, said possession being coupled with • 
the substantial and valuable improvements made by them 
and resulting in the strongest and most unequivocal act 
of part performance. Sixth, there is no question but that 
the plaintiff and his wife had constructive, if not actual, 
knowledge of the vast improvements in that there were • 
several phone conversations (Tr. 107) between the parties 
and that the plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that 
he drove by the premises four times daily in the romse 
of1 his employment (Tr. 11). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully suhmit that they are clearly 
entitled to have specific performance decreed of that oral ~ 
contract made with plaintiff and his wifo on .J11ly 24. 
1969, due to their substantial actions and performance 
in rPliance thereof, and that it won kl he a franrl :Hrain>l 
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)Wiem to allow plaintiff to act contrary to the oral con-
~ract. This matter should therefore be remanded back 
to the District Court with appropriate instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, JACKSON & JACKSON, 
By LeRay G. Jackson 
.Attorney for .A.ppeZloots 
